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I. INTRODUCTION

"Future historians will come to view the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 as one of the most formative pieces of
American socialpolicy legislationin the 20th century."'
Imagine that Jack, a man using a wheelchair, is elated to be on a
first date with Jill. His excitement quickly fades upon arriving at the
movies, however, when he discovers the movie theater has no
accessible seating. Because Jill starts to look uncomfortable, Jack
attempts to keep things running smoothly and parks his wheelchair in
the aisle. His wheelchair partially blocks the aisle, however, and
people make rude comments as they struggle to get around him. Jack
excuses himself to gain composure and to use the restroom. He
discovers that the bathroom stalls are too small for his wheelchair and
he cannot physically get to the toilets. Dejected, humiliated and
soaked in urine, he returns to Jill wondering how to tell her about his
predicament.
This is a modern movie theater built within the last decade. The
theater should be wheelchair accessible, but it is not. Jack does not
care about recovering money for this incident but since this is his
neighborhood movie theater he wants to be able to visit it in the future
and know that he will have full access to the facilities. After
consulting with an attorney, to his dismay Jack learns that even though
the theater was built in clear violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act 2 ("the ADA"), he may be out of luck because it was
the previous owners who built it. In other words, despite the existence

1. JONATHAN M. YOUNG, EQUALrrY OF OPPORTUNITY: THE MAKING OF THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (National Council on Disability 1997) (quoting

a joint statement in a forward by the National Council on Disability and the National
Rehabilitation Hospital Research Center).

2. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2006).
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of a blatant violation3 that continues to cause harm, courts' treatment
of ambiguous phrasing in the text of the ADA may deny Jack the
ability to seek a correction.
Under Title III of the ADA, two separate standards apply to a
public accommodation based on when it was constructed or altered.
The ADA lists out specific private entities affecting commerce that it
considers public accommodations, such as hotels, restaurants, and
movie theaters. 6 A facility built or altered (remodeled or changed)
before January 26, 1993 need only meet the "readily achievable"
standards.7 The readily achievable standards require alterations which
are "easily accomplishable and able to be carried out without much
difficulty or expense."8 Facilities built or altered after January 26,
1993 must comply with "new construction" standards. 9
New
construction standards are stricter and involve complex and detailed
specifications depending on the type of building.10 However, the
statutory language is unclear about who can be held liable for new
construction violations. Due to this lack of clarity, courts grapple with
the interplay between section 12182 (general rule) and section 12183
(new construction), often concluding that the language is clear, and
permitting buildings to remain noncompliant.11 This judicially created

3. U.S. Dept. of Justice 2010 ADA Standards for Accessible Design, §§ 213
(public
restrooms),
221
(movie
theater),
available
at
http://
www.ada.gov/regs2010/2010ADAStandards/2010ADAStandards.pdf.
4. This comment does not address the different opinions on how new
construction discrimination applies to public accommodations versus commercial
facilities. For an example, see Lonberg v. Sanborn Theater, Inc., 259 F.3d 1029,
1033-1036 (9f Cir. 2001). For purposes of this comment the reader may assume
that the term "public accommodation" encompasses commercial facilities. For
definitions see 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181(2), (7) (2006); 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2012).
5. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv); 12183(a)(1) (2006).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (2006).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv) (2006).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(9) (2006).
9. See 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(1) (2006); 28 C.F.R. § 36.406(a) (2011).
10. 28 C.F.R. § 36.406(a) (2011).
11. See Lonberg v. Sanborn Theaters, Inc., 271 F.3d 953, 954 No. 99-56221
(9th Cir. 2001); Laird v. Redwood Trust, LLC., 392 F.3d 661, 664 (4th Cir. 2004);
Paulick v. Ritz-Carlton Hotel Co., LLC, Nos. C-10-04107-CRB, C-10-01 1 15-CRB,
2011 WL 6141015, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2011) (order granting defendant's
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loophole effectively allows both builders and purchasers to escape
liability for inaccessible, discriminatory public facilities.
This loophole acts in derogation of the ADA's purpose, and is
neither justified nor mandated by rules of statutory construction. 12 A
public accommodation built in violation of the new construction
standards must be brought into compliance.13 The Ninth Circuit held
that the ADA must be "construed broadly" in order to effectuate its
purpose, which is to prevent discrimination against the disabled.14
Where a term is ambiguous, a court must look to legislative intent and
defer to the administrative agency Congress has charged with
implementing the law. 15 A conclusion that the new construction
section is "clear on its face" is questionable, given the current rigorous
debate amongst courts over the section's interpretation and the fact
that these interpretations are avoiding the new construction standard
entirely. 16 Even where a statute is "clear on its face," if it leads to a
result that is contrary to the statute's purpose, that interpretation
should not be adopted.17 While interpretation of the ADA is
confusing, its purpose, to eliminate discrimination against the
disabled, could not be clearer.' 8 Judicial decisions finding no one
liable for new construction violations run afoul of that purpose.
When a facility is built in violation of the new construction
standards, and is subsequently sold, by continuing to offer a public
partial summary judgment and denying plaintiffs' motions for partial summary
judgment).
12. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (2006) for the purpose of the ADA. See
discussion infra Part III.B.2. for support for the statutory construction assertion.
13. See 28 C.F.R. § 36.101; 28 C.F.R. § 36.406(a)(5) (explanation of
noncompliant "new construction"); 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. (stating that "new
construction" can simultaneously be an "existing facility" but this does not "relieve
the public accommodation of its obligations under the new construction
requirements.").
14. Barden v. City of Sacramento, 292 F.3d 1073, 1077 (9th Cir. 2002).
15. See generally Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837,
844 (1984); Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000); U.S. v. Mead
Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227-28 (2001).
16. See generally Paulick v. Ritz-Carlton Hotel Co., LLC, Nos. C-10-04107,
2011 WL 6141015 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2011); Lema v. Carson Hotel, LLC, No. CV10-07816 (C.D. Cal. June 19, 2012) (order granting partial summary judgment).
17. See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 510 (1989).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2006).
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accommodation not in compliance with the ADA, the new owner is
discriminating against its disabled patrons. Thus, a current owner1 9
should be held liable for the noncompliant building he now owns,
despite the fact that he was not involved in its design or construction.
The current owner is the best-situated, and perhaps the only person,
who can make changes to the non-compliant building.
The ADA, an essential and well-intentioned law, needs a bandaid. Recent court decisions have failed to impose "equal access"
responsibility on current-as opposed to original-building owners
and builders. 20 This judicially created loophole injures and weakens
the ADA. This Comment analyzes how courts have come to that
conclusion, examines the moral injustice the judicial loophole creates,
and proposes a remedy for this problem.
Part II briefly summarizes the relevant sections of the ADA and
the tools used for its interpretation. Part III discusses the problem in
depth, exploring different reasons for the loophole. Part IV asserts
that successive property owners can and should be held liable for the
noncompliant facilities they purchase by proposing legislative action
to make section 12183 explicit about who can be held liable for new
construction violations, coupled with a defense for innocent
purchasers. Absent legislative action, this Comment asserts that
section 12183 is ambiguous and calls for proper judicial deference to
congressional intent and the Department of Justice ("the DOJ"), as
well as better front-end enforcement to minimize litigation. Part V
concludes with a summary of the law, problems, and solutions.

19. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2006). This statute includes owners, operators,
lessors and lessees. Id. This comment focuses on current owners, but does not
necessarily exclude operators, lessors and lessees. Thus, when the author refers to
"owners" it encompasses operators, lessors and lessees as well.
20. See Paulick v. Ritz-Carlton Hotel Co., LLC, Nos. C-10-04107-CRB, C-1001 15-CRB, 2011 WL 6141015 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2011) (order granting defendant's
partial summary judgment and denying plaintiffs' motions for partial summary
judgment); Lema v. Carson Hotel, LLC, No. CV-10-07816-MMM (Ex) (C.D. Cal.
June 19, 2012) (order granting partial summary judgment); Rodriguez v. Investco,
LLC, 305 F.Supp.2d 1278, 1283 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 24, 2004).
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II. EXPLANATION OF THE LAW

A. Statutory Provisionsfor Title III of the ADA
In passing the ADA, Congress noted that the isolation and
segregation of persons with disabilities due to the discriminatory
effects of physical barriers are a "serious and pervasive social
problem," and there has been very little "legal recourse to redress such
discrimination." 2 1 The ADA lists several purposes, one of which is
"to provide clear, strong, consistent enforceable standards" as part of a
mandate to eliminate such discrimination. 22 The ADA is modeled
after section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.23 A key difference
is that while the Rehabilitation Act requires facilities that received
federal funding to be accessible to persons with disabilities, 24 Title III
of the ADA applies to places of public accommodation specified by
the ADA, regardless of the receipt of federal funding.2 5
The new construction's "readily accessible" standard is met if the
new construction or alteration is done in compliance with either the
1991 or the 2010 ADA Standards for Accessible Design. 26 These
standards include detailed, lengthy and technical specifications. 27 In
contrast, the "readily achievable" standard for existing facilities is met
by making alterations that are "easily accomplishable and able to be
carried out without much difficulty or expense." 28

21. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (2006).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2006).
23. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (2006 & Supp. II 2009) with U.S. Dep't. of
Justice, A Guide to Disability Rights Laws, 11-12 (2009), available at
http://www.ada.gov/cguide.htm.
24. 45 C.F.R. § 84.1 (1973).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (2006).
26. 28 C.F.R. § 36.406(a) (2011).
27. 28 C.F.R. Pt. 36, App. D (2011) (1991 Standards for Accessible Design as
Originally Published on July 26, 1991).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(9) (2006).
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B. Advisory and Technical Assistance Materials
After its passage, Congress charged the DOJ with implementing
the ADA. 29 One of the DOJ's ongoing tasks, in partnership with the
Federal Access Board, is to create regulations to provide guidance for
the enforcement of the ADA. 30 Congress created the Federal Access
Board in 1973 to ensure access to federally funded buildings, and it
has become a "leading source of information on accessible design." 31
The DOJ codifies the resulting regulations in the Code of Federal
Regulations, and the appendices of that code further explain the
regulations. 32 In 1991, the Federal Access Board created the ADA
Accessibility Guidelines ("the ADAAG"). 33 The ADAAG were
purely advisory to the DOJ and addressed new construction
standards. 34 The DOJ then sought public comment on the ADAAG,
made applicable changes based on those comments, and finally
adopted and codified the ADAAG as the official standards for the
ADA.s In 2010, the DOJ released a revised version, which became
effective March 15, 2012 and extended the regulations to previously
uncovered areas. 36

29. 42 U.S.C. §12206(a)(1) (2006).
30. 42 U.S.C. §12206(b) (2006).
31. U.S. AcCESs BOARD, http://www.access-board.gov/about.htm (last visited
Feb. 4, 2013).
32. See 28 C.F.R. § 36.101 (2011) for an example of a codified regulation; 28
C.F.R. Pt. 36, App. A (2011) for an example of the appendix.
33. U.S. AcCESs BOARD, http://www.access-board.gov/adaag/html/into; U.S.
ACCESS BOARD, http://acess-board.gov/ada (last visited Feb. 4, 2013).
34. U.S. ACCESS BOARD, http://www.access-board.gov/ada (last visited Feb. 4.
2013).
35. For example of seeking public commentary, see U.S. Dep't. of Justice,
Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, AG Order No. 2736-2004 (2005)
http://www.ada.gov/archive/anprm04.htm; for codified standards see 28 C.F.R. pt.
36, app. D (2011); The Access Board's version was called "ADAAG," and when the
DOJ codified the ADAAG they were considered, "Standards,"
despite any
continued reference to the ADAAG today. U.S. ACCESS BOARD, http://www.accessboard.gov/ada (last visited Feb. 4, 2013).
36. U.S. Dep't. of Justice, 2010 ADA Standards for Accessible Design, 1, 1
(2010),
http://www.ada.gov/regs2010/2010ADAStandards/2010ADAStandards
prt.pdf.
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The Technical Assistance Manual to Title III of the ADA exists
"to assist individuals and entities in understanding their rights and
duties under the [ADA]." 37 It requires: "All newly constructed places
of public accommodation and commercial facilities must be readily
accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities to the extent
that it is not structurally impracticable.

. .

. This means that facilities

must be built in strict compliance with the [ADAAG]." 3 The manual
explains that the "readily achievable" standard for existing facilities is
a "lower" and "less demanding" standard than the standards for new
construction or alteration, and specifies that there is no cost defense to
the new construction requirements. 39
C. Explanation ofADA through Case Law
Courts have upheld the "two distinct systems for regulating
building accessibility: one to apply to existing facilities (those
designed and constructed for occupancy before January 26, 1993) and
another to apply to later-constructed facilities." 40 Pre-existing or
"grandfathered facilities" only need remove easily removed barriers.4 1
In contrast to grandfathered facilities, new construction violations are
indefensible, unless there is a structural impracticability.4 2
A
structural impracticability exists when "unique characteristics ...
make accessibility unusually difficult to achieve." 43 Apart from
structural impracticability, courts have no authority to apply equitable
*44
discretion in excusing the violation.
It is easy to find further judicial support of the basic procedures
under advisory and technical assistance materials. For instance, in the
37. U.S. Dep't. of Justice, ADA Title III Technical Assistance Manual (1993),
http://www.ada.gov/taman3.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2012).
38. U.S. Dep't. of Justice, ADA Title III Technical Assistance Manual III5.1000 (1993) at http://www.ada.gov/taman3.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2012).
39. U.S. Dep't. of Justice, ADA Title III Technical Assistance Manual III4.4200 (1993) at http://www.ada.gov/taman3.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2012).
40. Long v. Coast Resorts, Inc., 267 F.3d 918, 923 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing 42
U.S.C. §§ 12183(a)(1), 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv)(2006)).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See id.
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case of newly constructed facilities, compliance with the ADA's
antidiscrimination mandate requires that facilities be constructed in
conformity with the ADAAG, which ". . . [l]ay out the technical

structural requirements of places of public accommodation." 45 In
contrast, "[T]he ADA requires existing facilities to remove barriers to
access so long as removal is readily achievable, regardless of whether
the facility has been altered." 4 6

This lower standard ". . . [w]as

specifically drafted to protect existing businesses from undue

hardship." 4 7
Overall, statutes, advisory and technical assistance materials, and
case law work as a team to contribute to a cohesive understanding of
the ADA. When the team stops working together, confusion and
injustice replace the hopes voiced by President George H.W. Bush,
"[E]very man, woman, and child with a disability can now pass
through once-closed doors into a bright new era of equality,
48
independence and freedom."
III. CURRENT TREATMENT OF THE ISSUE
Unfortunately, the judicial system's current treatment of the issue
is leading to discriminatory results. 49 While few cases directly
address successor liability for new construction defects, several

45. Chapman v. Pier I Imp. (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 945 (9th Cir. 2011).
46. Californians for Disability Rights v. Mervyn's LLC, 165 Cal. App. 4th
571, 586 (2008).
47. Pinnock v. Int'l House of Pancakes Franchisee, 844 F. Supp. 574, 588
(S.D. Cal. 1993).
48. Remarks on Signing the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 26
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc., 1162, 1163 (July 26, 1990).
49. See Paulick v. Ritz-Carlton Hotel Co., LLC, Nos. C-10-04107-CRB, C-100115-CRB, 2011 WL 6141015 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2011) (order granting defendant's
partial summary judgment and denying plaintiffs' motions for partial summary
judgment); Lema v. Carson Hotel, LLC, No. CV-10-07816-MMM (Ex) (C.D. Cal.
June 19, 2012) (order granting partial summary judgment); Rodriguez v. Investco,
LLC, 305 F.Supp.2d 1278 (M.D. Fla. 2004). (In each of these cases, the Court
found that the current owner of the public accommodation in question was not liable
for the current and ongoing violation of "new construction" standards, despite
owning and offering such a facility to the public. Thus, discrimination was allowed
to exist and continue in the form of "new construction" violations.)
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interpret sections 12182 and 12183 in different contexts.o When
decisions from these different contexts are applied to successor
liability, unjust results occur.5 1 Where the issue has been directly
litigated, courts have concluded the statutory language is plain and
have declined to look at congressional intent. 52 In addition, the
application of different canons of statutory construction with no
uniform method leads to confusion because states across the nation are
using different approaches to interpret a federal statute. 53 Lastly,
rather than incorporating preventative measures, ADA enforcement
occurs through a reactive system of litigation. 54 The result is a
weakened federal law that allows discrimination to continue.
A. Conflicting JudicialInterpretationand Case Law
There are no appellate level decisions outlining which standards
to apply in circumstances where the property was originally built in
violation of the "new construction" Access Standards, and is now held
by a new owner not involved in its design or construction. There are,
however, two conflicting appellate court decisions that provide an
interpretation of sections 12182 and 12183, as well as one that avoids

50. See U.S. v. Days Inn of Am., Inc., 151 F.3d 822, 825 (8th Cir. 1998);
Lonberg v. Sanborn Theaters Inc., 259 F.3d 1029, 1033 (9th Cir. 2001); Laird v.
Redwood Trust, LLC., 392 F.3d 661, 663 (4th Cir. 2004).
51. See Paulick v. Ritz-Carlton Hotel Co., LLC, Nos. C-10-04107-CRB, C-1001 15-CRB, 2011 WL 6141015 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2011) (order granting defendant's
partial summary judgment and denying plaintiffs' motions for partial summary
judgment); Lema v. Carson Hotel, LLC, No. CV-10-07816-MMM (Ex) (C.D. Cal.
June 19, 2012) (order granting partial summary judgment). (Both cases referred to
Lonberg and in consequence found no liability for current owners, allowing
discrimination to continue in the form of "new construction" violations.)
52. Paulick v. Ritz-Carlton Hotel Co., LLC, Nos. C-10-04107-CRB, C-100115-CRB, 2011 WL 6141015 at *5-6 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2011) (order granting
defendant's partial summary judgment and denying plaintiffs' motions for partial
summary judgment); Lema v. Carson Hotel, LLC, No. CV-10-07816-MMM (Ex), at
*15-17 (C.D. Cal. June 19, 2012) (order granting partial summary judgment).
53. NORMAN J. SINGER AND J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, Sutherland Statutes &
Statutory construction § 45:2 (7th ed. 2012).
54. See infra Part III. C.
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the application of the standard entirely.55 In addition, a handful of
district court decisions take conflicting approaches. 56
1. Appellate Courts
In U.S. v. Days Inn of America, Inc., the Eighth Circuit analyzed
sections 12182 and 12183. There, the court decided whether a
franchisor could be held liable for the new construction violations
committed by its franchisee. 57 The franchisee had a Days Inn built by
an architect suggested by the franchisor and the Inn violated the ADA
"new construction" standards.5 8 The franchisor argued that only
current owners, lessors, lessees or operators could be held liable under
section 12182(a).5 9 The court rejected that argument to hold that
liability is not limited to "persons who own, lease, or operate
facilities." 60 Rather, to be liable a party "must possess a significant
degree of control over the final design and construction of the
facility."6 1
In Lonberg v. Sanborn Theaters Inc., the Ninth Circuit addressed
whether architects who designed a public accommodation in violation
of the new construction standards could be held liable under section
12183.62 The court interpreted the statutory scheme to provide
injunctive relief for complainants, holding that "[A]ctions under Title
55. For the conflicting appellate Court decisions see U.S. v. Days Inn of Am.,
Inc., 151 F.3d 822, 825 (8th Cir. 1998); Lonberg v. Sanborn Theaters Inc., 259 F.3d
1029, 1036 (9th Cir. 2001). For the decision that avoids application of sections
12182 and 12183 liability via an exception see Laird v. Redwood Trust, LLC., 392
F.3d 661, 664-65 (4th Cir. 2004).
56. Case law in this comment comes disproportionally from California and
Florida. The ADA only provides for damages brought by the attorney general, not
via private enforcement. However, certain states have enacted laws parallel to the
ADA that allow for private recovery of damages. Thus we see a high volume of
litigation in the states that have enacted such legislation, and virtually none coming
from states that have no such statutes. See Munson v. Del Taco, 42 Cal.4th 661, 669
(2009) for an example.
57. U.S. v. Days Inn of Am., Inc., 151 F.3d 822 (8th Cir. 1998).
58. Id. at 824.
59. Id. at 825.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 826.
62. Lonberg v. Sanborn Theaters Inc., 259 F.3d 1029, 1030 (9th Cir. 2001).
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III are limited only to injunctive relief . . . after the noncompliant
building has already been built . .. injunctive relief is only meaningful

against the person currently in control of the building." 63 The
Lonberg court reasoned that if only the original persons involved in
the "design and construction" failures are held responsible, they will
often be "out of the picture" by the "time of suit" and this would
"create liability in persons against whom there is no meaningful
remedy provided by the statute." 64 Declining to follow Days Inn, the
court proceeded to hold the exact opposite. To avoid this unavailabledefendant conundrum, only current owners, lessors, lessees or
operators can be held liable for new construction violations. 65 it
rejected the idea that, "[A]nyone possessing a significant degree of
control over the final design and construction of a facility is liable." 66
In an amended opinion, the Lonberg court considered the disabled
plaintiffs request that it defer to the DOJ and find that architects
should be held liable for new construction. 67 The Lonberg court
declined, explaining that because the statute was unambiguous, it need
not defer to the DOJ on architect liability. 6 8 Additionally, two
subsequent California cases added an additional criterion to the Ninth
Circuit's holding in Lonberg, when they applied that holding directly
to the issue of whether subsequent owners should be held liable for
new construction defects. 69
Finally, in Laird v. Redwood Trust, LLC, the Fourth Circuit
disagreed with the district court's holding that the ADA's language

63. Id. at 1036.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1034-35 (citations omitted).
67. Lonberg v. Sanborn Theaters, Inc., 271 F.3d 953, 954 (9th Cir. 2001).
68. Id.
69. See Paulick v. Ritz-Carlton Hotel Co., LLC, Nos. C-10-04107-CRB, C-1001115-CRB, 2011 WL 6141015 at *2-6 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2011) (order granting
defendants' motion for partial summary judgment and denying plaintiffs motions
for partial summary judgment); Lema v. Carson Hotel, LLC, No. CV-10-07816MMM (Ex) at *12-20 (C.D. Cal. June 19, 2012) (order granting partial summary
judgment). These cases added the requirement that owners must participate in
designing and constructing the facility for first occupancy onto Lonberg's holding
that only owners could be held liable.
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was ambiguous. 70 The defendant had recently purchased a building
and made substantial alterations to it, including an added level. If the
level was a "story" pursuant to the ADAAG, then the owners had
violated the new construction standards by not including an elevator. 7 1
Rather than construe the ADA broadly to encourage new construction
compliance, the Laird court applied an exception for installing
elevators by calling the added level a "mezzanine" rather than an
additional "story." 72
These decisions contradict one another and confuse lower courts.
Based on the precedent in their respective appellate circuits, lower
courts in the Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits are now required to
interpret the ADA differently from one another,7 3 and the precedent is
troubling. In the Eighth Circuit, Days Inn directs lower courts to find
persons who significantly contributed to the design or construction of
a facility liable for new construction defects. 74 Yet, courts in the
Ninth Circuit have Lonberg as precedent, which held that current
owners should be held liable for new construction liability.7 5 Lonberg
also set the precedent that lower courts need not look to the DOJ or
congressional intent when interpreting section 12183.76 Lastly, in the
Fourth Circuit, courts are left to their own interpretations because the
Laird court did not directly address new construction liability for the
current owner. 77 While the new owner in Laird was arguably the one
who violated the new construction standards, 78 it was an example of
another court that found section 12183 clear on its face. Together,
these decisions illustrate a general judicial reluctance to impose new
construction liability.

70. Laird v. Redwood Trust, LLC., 392 F.3d 661, 664 (4th Cir. 2004).
71. Id. at 663-64.
72. Id. at 664-65.
73. See U.S. v. Days Inn of Am., Inc., 151 F.3d 822 (8th Cir. 1998); Lonberg
v. Sanborn Theaters Inc., 259 F.3d 1029 (9th Cir. 2001); Laird v. Redwood Trust,
LLC., 392 F.3d 661 (4th Cir. 2004).
74. U.S. v. Days Inn of Am., Inc., 151 F.3d 822, 825-26 (8th Cir. 1998).
75. Lonberg v. Sanborn Theaters Inc., 259 F.3d 1029, 1036 (9th Cir. 2001).
76. See Lonberg v. Sanborn Theaters, Inc., 271 F.3d 953, 954 (9th Cir. 2001).
77. Laird v. Redwood Trust, LLC., 392 F.3d 661, 664 (4th Cir. 2004).
78. See id. at 662-63.
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2. Lower Courts
Among the handful of courts that have directly addressed this
issue, none have engaged in a serious exploration. Arguments relating
to the internal structure of the statutory scheme are not addressed. For
example, none of the decisions to date have addressed liability of
current owners for current decisions to buy property that comes with
ADA obligations.7 9 When an owner purchases a piece of property,
there is a decision to be made about what that property is suitable for
and how it should be utilized. If the property is defective in the sense
that it is not built in compliance with the Access Standards, then it is a
discriminatory decision by the new owner to use it as a place of public
accommodation.
However, one lower court stands out from the rest, albeit via a
parallel state law. In Hodges v. El Torito Restaurants,Inc., the court
construed a California scheme that parallels the ADA. 80 There, the
court was presented with the key question, "[W]hether the current
owner of a building can be held liable for the previous owner's failure
to make the restaurant accessible." 8 ' The Hodges court held that a
new owner could be held liable and reasoned that otherwise,
"businesses would be able to circumvent" the law through "sham sales
and transfers" and that the "legislature did not intend to enact such a
self-eviscerating law." 82
The court decided differently in Paulick v. Ritz-Carlton Hotel
Co 83 crafting a general rule that "subsequent owners, lessees, lessors,
and operators of a public accommodation who did not participate in
designing and constructing the facility for first occupancy are not
liable under the ADA for any of its design and construction defects." 84
79. While opinions in Paulick, Lema and Hodges discuss successor liability
for new construction defects, they do not discuss the buyer's decision and
subsequent responsibility in purchasing a non-compliant facility.
80. Hodges v. El Torito Rest., Inc., No. C-96-2242-VRW, 1998 WL 95398 at
*3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 1998).
81. Id.
82. Id. at *3-5.
83. Paulick v. Ritz-Carlton Hotel Co., LLC, Nos. C-10-04107, 2011 WL
6141015 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2011) (order granting defendants' motion for partial
summary judgment and denying plaintiff s motions for partial summary judgment).
84. Id. at *2.
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Additionally, in Rodriguez v. Investco, L.L.C., despite
property consisting of new construction built in violation of
Access Standards, the court found the new owners "had
involvement in the original design or construction of the facility,"
found no liability.85

323
the
the
no
and

3. In-Depth Analysis of Two On-PointCases
It is useful to pause here and take a closer look at Paulick, and a
connected case, Lema v. Carson Hotel, LLC. 86 Each ended in
summary judgment and provided clear examples of judicial decisions
that perpetuate the loophole that allows new construction violations to
persist. The facts in both cases involve disabled hotel patrons suing to
bring the hotels into compliance with the "new construction"
standards.8 7
In Paulick, the plaintiff argued against partial summary judgment
stating that the DOJ itself had argued for the application of new
construction successor liability in a similar case.8 8 In addition, the
plaintiff provided general support for the practice of liberally applying
common law successor liability to federal civil rights actions.89 The
court admitted that the ADA appeared to require new owners to
remove barriers under new construction standards, but stated that this
issue was not before the court. 90 Instead, the court focused on whether
85. Rodriguez v. Investco, LLC, 305 F.Supp.2d 1278, 1283-85 (M.D. Fla.
2004).
86. Lema v. Carson Hotel, LLC, No. CV-10-07816-MMM (Ex) (C.D. Cal.
June 19, 2012) (order granting partial summary judgment).
87. Paulick v. Ritz-Carlton Hotel Co., LLC, Nos. C-10-04107, 2011 WL
6141015 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2011) (order granting defendants' motion for partial
summary judgment and denying plaintiff's motions for partial summary judgment);
Lema v. Carson Hotel, LLC, No. CV-10-07816 (C.D. Cal. June 19, 2012) (order
granting partial summary judgment).
88. Paulick v. Ritz-Carlton Hotel Co., LLC, No. C-10-4107-CRB, at *3-4
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2011) (opposition to defendant's motion for partial summary
judgment).
89. Id. at *4.
90. Paulick v. Ritz-Carlton Hotel Co., LLC, Nos. C-10-04107-CRB, C-1001115-CRB, 2011 WL 6141015, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2011) (order granting
defendant's partial summary judgment and denying plaintiffs' motions for partial
summary judgment).
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the plain language of the ADA permits plaintiffs to sue to enforce that
requirement.91 The court found the ADA did not permit such a suit,
claiming the plain language of sections 12182(a) and 12183(a) led to a
simple answer.92 The court stated section 12183 limited the definition
of discrimination to a failure to design, construct or alter a facility
under the new construction standards, so the defendant's failure to
provide an accessible facility was not discrimination. 93 In essence, the
court noted that there was likely a requirement for subsequent owners
to bring their buildings into compliance with new construction
standards, but ruled that plaintiffs have no way to enforce it.94
Lema followed suit, but hesitation accompanied its decision. The
court analyzed the Paulick decision, concluding it did not fully
understand how the Paulick court applied a decision finding that an
architect could not be liable for new construction noncompliance 95 to
successive owners. 9 6 Despite this, the Lema court called the Paulick
decision "the most plausible interpretation" and agreed with the plain
meaning approach to find no liability for the current hotel owner. 97
Between the two cases, Lema addressed the plaintiff's arguments
more directly. In his opposition to summary judgment, the plaintiff
called for liberal application of successor liability to federal civil
rights statutes. The Lema court did not disagree, but still declined to
do so. 98 Instead, the Lema court compared clauses in the ADA to a
proffered remedial statute, finding them too dissimilar to apply
successor liability on that theory. 99 Next, the plaintiff voiced concerns
about purposeful evasion of the new construction standards if current
owners are not required to remove barriers.' 00 Commercial real estate
companies in the business of building and immediately selling

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
Cal. June
97.

Id.
Id. at *5-6.
Id. at *5.
Id. at *3, *6.
See id. at *6.
Lema v. Carson Hotel, LLC, No. CV-10-07816-MMM (Ex), at *16 (C.D.
19, 2012) (order granting partial summary judgment).
Id. at* 17.

98. Id. at**17-18.
99. Id.
100. Id. at *18-19.
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property could avoid complying with the new construction
requirements, and avoid liability by selling to someone who could also
avoid liability.10 ' There would be nothing in place to de-incentivize
this practice. The court acknowledged this possibility as a serious
one, but concluded plaintiffs in such situations would not be without
redress because they would still have the lower "readily achievable"
requirements for existing facilities.1 02
The court further
acknowledged the unfairness of that conclusion, but avoided further
comment by stating it was not at issue in the case.103 Lerna noted its
interpretation would limit the number of actors who could be held
liable, but included a caveat that the interpretation could be
incorrect. 104
Thus, both cases found to directly address successor liability for
new construction noncompliance take leave from Lonberg, an
appellate level case that analyzes section 12183 for architectural
liability.10 Unjust results continue to abound, resulting in ignored
new construction standards and ultimately, discrimination.
B. UnclearStatutory Construction
The relevant statutory language involves sections 12182 and
12183. Section 12182 is the "general rule" and states that no disabled
person "shall be discriminated against" in the "full and equal
enjoyment

of . . . accommodations

of any place of public

accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or
operates a place of public accommodation." 106 Section 12183(a)
refers to section 12182 and states, "[A]s applied to public
accommodations . . . discrimination for purposes of section 12182(a)
of this title includes . . . a failure to design and construct facilities ...
and . . . a failure to make alterations

.

.

.

[that]

are readily

accessible. . ."07
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
2001).
106.
107.

Id. at *19.
Id. at *18-20.
Id. at *19-20.
Id. at *20.
See Lonberg v. Sanborn Theaters Inc., 259 F.3d 1029, 1033-36 (9th Cir.
42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2006).
42 U.S.C. § 12183(a) (2006).
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The language in section 12182 is broad, and is open to
interpretation. Section 12183 only lists two types of discrimination as
applied to new construction. 108 Some courts conclude the list in
section 12183 is exhaustive, holding as a matter of law that an owner
of a facility cannot discriminate unless he took part in the design,
construction or alteration of that facility. 109 However, the word
"includes" precedes the two listed types of discrimination in section
12183(a), suggesting the list is not exhaustive. 110 "Ambiguity exists
when a statute is capable of being understood by reasonably wellinformed persons in two or more different senses.""' It would seem,
then, the statute is ambiguous.
1. Deference to the Departmentof Justice
As there is more than one plausible interpretation of section
12183, courts should not hold it to be clear on its face.11 2 Chevron
U.S.A v. National Resources Defense Council and its progeny together
hold that when a statute is not clear on its face, a court will defer to an
authorized, formal agency's interpretation of the statute. 113 The only
time a prior judicial interpretation of a statute trumps an agency's
interpretation is when the federal court's interpretation flows from an
unambiguous reading of the statute. 1 14 When found unambiguous, the
standard set forth in Chevron does not apply and courts need not look
108. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182(a); 12183(a) (A failure to (1) construct or (2)
alter facilities per new construction standards) .
109. See Paulick v. Ritz-Carlton Hotel Co., LLC, Nos. C-10-04107-CRB and
C-10-01115-CRB, 2011 WL 6141015 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2011); Lema v. Carson
Hotel, LLC, No. CV-10-07816-MMM (Ex) (C.D. Cal. June 19, 2012) (order
granting partial summary judgment).
110. 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a) (2006).
111. SINGER supra note 53.
112. See Paulick v. Ritz-Carlton Hotel Co., LLC, Nos. C-10-04107-CRB, C10-01 15-CRB, 2011 WL 6141015 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2011); Lema v. Carson Hotel,
LLC, No. CV-10-07816-MMM (Ex) (C.D. Cal. June 19, 2012) (order granting
partial summary judgment). Both held § 12183 to be plain on its face.
113. See generally Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837
(1984); Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576 (2000); U.S. v. Mead Corp., 533
U.S. 218 (2001).
114. Nat'l. Cable & Telecomm. Assn. v. Brand X Internet Serv., 545 U.S. 967,
982 (2005)
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any further than the language itself.1 15 Even if Chevron does apply,
courts can similarly avoid deference to the DOJ by deciding that the
DOJ's interpretation is outside the "permissible construction" of the
statute.1 1 6 However, "remedial statutes should be liberally construed
in order to effectuate the remedial purpose for which [they were]
enacted ...11

These competing interests in statutory interpretation

contribute to the problem.
2. Canons of Constructionand Public Policy
[I]t is one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed
jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to
remember that statutes always have some purpose or object to
accomplish, whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the
surest guide to their meaning.1
Part of the interpretation problem comes from varying types of
canons of construction with no set rule on uniform application for the
ADA. Early in our country's history, the U.S. Supreme Court
provided guidance, stating that where a statute is ambiguous, courts
should consider the very problem that gave rise to the statute to
determine how the words in question should be resolved.1 19 Getting
caught up in tedious scrutiny over specific words can lead to an
interpretation that goes against the statute's purpose, or what Justice
Scalia refers to as an "absurd result." 20 Interpreting the ADA to
impose liability on neither the original violator nor the successive
purchaser allows the very discrimination the ADA aims to prevent.
This interpretation contradicts congressional intent and renders an
unjust result, if not an absurd one.

115. SINGER supra note 53.
116. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
117. SINGER supra note 53, § 60:1.
118. Steven Wisotsky, How to Interpret Statutes-OrNot: Plain Meaning and
Other Phantoms, 10 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 321, 345 (2009) (citing Cabell v.
Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945)).
119. U.S. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 91 U.S. 72, 79 (1875).
120. Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
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In light of the confusing and sporadic application of canons,
courts often fall into the trap of hyper-focusing on words. Congress
has overridden a plethora of Supreme Court statutory
interpretations.121 In 1999 and 2002, the Supreme Court weighed in
on the definition of "disabled" under the ADA.1 22 In both cases, the
Court ruled that certain disabilities were not covered under the
ADA.1 23
Congress wholeheartedly disagreed and in response
overturned both Supreme Court decisions in an amendment to the
ADA.1 24 The Supreme Court had focused on the precise meaning of
"disability" stating that "no agency was authorized to interpret the
term," leading it to conclude that certain persons should be
excluded.125 Congress responded that it "expected that the definition
of disability under the ADA would be interpreted consistently with
how courts had applied the definition of a handicapped individual
under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, [but] that expectation has not

been fulfilled."

26

Congress went on to say the Supreme Court had interpreted the
terms of the ADA "to require a greater degree of limitation than was
intended by Congress," creating "too high a standard." 27 The
Supreme Court failed to consider that "the ADA must be construed
broadly in order to effectively implement the ADA's fundamental
purpose of providing a clear and comprehensive national mandate for
the elimination of discrimination against individuals with

disabilities."1 2 8

121. William N. Eskridge, Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation
Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 337 (1991).
122. See generally Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999);
Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
123. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999); Toyota Motor
Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 199 (2002).
124. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553
(2008).
125. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 194 (2002).
126. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, §
2(a)(3) (2008).
127. Id. § 2(a)(3)-(8).
128. Barden v. City of Sacramento, 292 F.3d 1073, 1077 (9th Cir. 2002)
(internal quotations and cites removed).
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Current trends may be to blame for the Court's lack of broad
interpretation. In a recent in-depth analysis of trends in judicial
statutory interpretation, the Congressional Research Service asserted,
"[o]ne can search in vain for recent Supreme Court reliance on the
canon that 'remedial statutes' should be 'liberally' or 'broadly
construed."' 129 It went on to explain the vague and disputed meaning
of "broad construction" as well as Justices' individual preferences as
the culprits. 130
The report suggests the simple solution that
ambiguities in remedial statutes be resolved in favor of the people it
was meant to protect. 13 1 Finally the report concludes with the truism
that, "categorizing a statute as 'remedial,' or even as a 'civil rights
statute,' is no substitute for a more refined analysis of the purposes of
the particular statute at issue." 32
C. Enforcement is Back-Ended and Sporadic
Lastly, the current system waits for a problem and fixes it through

litigation. 133 There is no federal building code inspector or local
official who has the authority to waive or enforce federal access
standards. 134 In other words, "the ADA is not enforced by State or
local building inspectors." 3 5 Instead, access standards are enforced
through "litigation initiated by the DOJ and through litigation initiated
129. YULE KIM,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-589,
STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS, 29 (2008) (footnote
omitted).
130. Id. at 30 n.169 (citing Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canards of Legal
Analysis, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 581, 586 (1989-90) ("Justice Scalia has
inveighed against the maxim in a lecture reprinted as a law review article, calling it a
'prime example[ ] of lego-babble.' The rule, Justice Scalia concluded, 'is both of
indeterminate coverage (since no one knows what a "remedial statute" is) and of
indeterminate effect (since no one knows how liberal is a liberal construction).").
131. Id. at n.170. ("See, e.g., Smith v. Heckler, 820 F.2d 1093, 1095 (9th Cir.
1987) (Social Security Act 'is remedial, to be construed liberally ... and not so as to
withhold benefits in marginal cases')").
132. Id. at n.173.
133. See U.S. Dep't. of Justice, ADA Title III Technical Assistance Manual §
111-7.1000(A) (1994 Supp.) available at http://www.ada.gov/taman3.html (last
visited Oct. 27, 2012).
134. Id.
135. Id.
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by private parties."136 Again, if compliance with the new construction

standards is terminated upon the sale of the property, enforcement will
be obstructed because "injunctive relief is only meaningful against the
person currently in control of the building."1 37
IV. LIABILITY SHOULD BE IMPOSED ON CURRENT PROPERTY OWNERS
DESPITE LACK OF INVOLVEMENT IN CONSTRUCTION OR DESIGN

Many judicial interpretations of section 12183 leave a gap of
liability coverage that is irreconcilable with congressional intent.
Originally, Congress authored sections 12182 and 12183 as one
section, but in the final bill separated them to distinguish between
public accommodations in section 12182 and commercial facilities in
section 12183.138 In separating them, "Congress gave no indication
that it sought to make the parties who could be held liable for the
discrimination described in § 12183(a) any different from the parties
who could be held liable for the discrimination described in §

12182(b)."l 39
Liability, at least initially, should be bome by the person with the
most control over the creation of the access barrier.

.

.

When

construction finishes, however, that is not the end of the case. At
that point, control shifts, and someone else assumes responsibility.
Title 11I prescribes an affirmative duty, not only to remove existing
barriers, but also to maintain new construction free from any
barriers. The exceptions for existing facilities do not apply to new
construction; hence, it makes sense to restrict liability for such a
high level of duty to the role rather than to the specific
individual. 140
In 2011, the DOJ released a new definition of "existing facility,"
which clarifies that while facilities subject to the new construction
standards also become existing facilities when completed and sold,
136. Id.
137. Lonberg v. Sanborn Theaters Inc., 259 F.3d 1029, 1036 (9th Cir. 2001).
138. Id. at 1035, n.7.
139. Id.
140. Michael V. Kelly, Weakening Title III of The Americans With Disabilities
Act:
The Buckhannon Decision and Other Developments Limited Private
Enforcement, 10 ELDER L.J. 361, 389-90 (2002).
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this does not mean the facilities revert to the "readily achievable"
standard.14 1 Indeed, "a newly constructed facility remains subject to
the accessibility standards in effect at the time of design and
construction . . ."142 "The fact that the facility is also an existing
facility does not relieve the public accommodation of its obligations
under the new construction requirements of this part."1 43 Thus, the
DOJ clarifies that its intent is for new construction liability to be
linked with the public accommodation. This is consistent with
applying liability to the current owner - whoever is in control of the
public accommodation, regardless of involvement in its design or
construction.
A. Comparison to Other Remedial Statutes
In Lema, the plaintiff offered a comparison between an
employment anti-discrimination statute (Family Leave Medical Act
("the FMLA")) and the ADA. In particular, the plaintiff asserted that
in determining successor liability, the ADA should have the same
multi-factor test as the FMLA.14 4 Lema's conclusion, that the ADA
and the FMLA were too different to warrant the comparison, ignored
the fact that "successor liability has widely been imposed in federal
civil rights actions with great liberality."1 45 While the "great
liberality" cited in the plaintiffs opposition motion completely
revolved around employment discrimination, other types of remedial
statutes, including one for environmental protection, also impose
Each statute has unique provisions and
successor liability. 146
definitions, yet successor liability is permitted when an injured party

141. 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. A (2011).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Lema v. Carson Hotel LLC, CV-10-07816-MMM (Ex), at *17 (2012)
(citing Sullivan v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc. 623 F.3d 770 (9 " Cir. 2010)).
145. Id. at *17-18 for Lema's conclusion; Plaintiff's Opposition to
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at *13 Lema v. Carson Hotel, LLC, No.
CV10-7816-MMM (Ex) (2012) (citing Wheeler v. Snyder Buick, Inc., 794 F.2d
1228, 1235-35 (7th Cir. 1986)).
146. See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (2006) for an example.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2012

23

California Western Law Review, Vol. 49 [2012], No. 2, Art. 6

332

CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

would experience an unjust result without it. 147 Applying successor
liability for new construction standards is therefore warranted.
1. Comparing the ADA to CERCLA and its Innocent
Landowner Defense
At first glance, the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"),1 48 does not seem to
draw parallel to the ADA.1 4 9 Congress enacted this law on December
11, 1980, close in time to the ADA's enactment.1 50 CERCLA granted
"broad Federal authority" to manage hazardous substances that "may
endanger public health or the environment."' 5 ' In addition, CERCLA
directly addresses the successor liability issue by expressly providing
that successive property owners are liable for the cleanup of hazardous
waste. 152 It does not matter that the current owner played no part in
creating or depositing the hazardous waste and indeed is often the
case. 153
In 1989, the Environmental Protection Agency ("the EPA")
parlayed its authority to issue settlements for de minimis landowners
to create a defense against CERCLA liability for innocent landowners
("ILO").154 To qualify as an LO, a landowner must conduct "all
appropriate inquiries" to establish they "had no reason to know of the
[liability]. "155 In 2002, the Brownfields Amendments partially
amended the ILO defense by specifying requirements for "appropriate
inquiries."156 The criteria the Brownfields Amendments set forth for
147. Musikiwamba v. ESSI, Inc., 760 F.2d 740, 750 (7th Cir. 1985).
148. Also known as "Superfund."
149. See generally CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2006).
150. CERCLA Overview, United States Environmental Protective Agency,
http://www.epa.gov/superfund/policy/cercla.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2012).
151. Id.
152. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (2006).
153. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(4)(2006).
154. Innocent Landowners, United States Environmental Protective Agency,
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/cleanup/revitalization/ilo.html (last visited Oct. 27,
2012).
155. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A)(i) (2006).
156. United States Environmental Protective Agency, http://www.epa.gov/
compliance/cleanup/revitalization/ilo.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2012).
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"appropriate inquiries" are extensive, requiring a buyer to obtain
reports from an environmental professional, review federal, state and
local records, search for environmental liens on the property, conduct
visual inspections of the property and research the chain of title.' 57
CERCLA's construction is a good example of a remedial statute
imposing successor liability. Public safety is important enough to
impose liability on whoever currently owns the property, regardless of
However, indirect
responsibility for the original violation.
responsibility is acknowledged in the ILO defense requirements by
making qualification hinge on the buyer "doing their homework" on
the property before purchase. Similarly, preventing or stopping
discrimination based on disabilities is a highly moral and important
purpose.15 8 It follows that successor liability should also be imposed
for new construction violations in the ADA.
2. Reason for Lack of Successor InterestProvision in Title III
CERCLA's construction begs the question: why did the authors of
the ADA fail to include such a provision? Legislative history reveals
little guidance on this question. The ADA's silence on successor
liability can be interpreted as an intention to rule out a particular
statutory application, an expectation that nothing more need be said to
show legislative intent, or a lack of consideration for the issue at all. 159
However, "an inference drawn from congressional silence certainly
cannot be credited when it is contrary to all other textual and
contextual evidence of congressional intent."16 0
It is quite possible that the ADA's authors simply did not think of
successor liability. Given the clear mandate of the new construction
standards, it is a weak argument to assert that Congress did not intend
successor liability simply because they did not include it originally.
"Because all future circumstances cannot be anticipated by even the
most far-sighted legislator, the necessity for judicial interpretation can

157. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B)(iii)(I-X) (2006).
158. See Young, supra note 1, at xi. "[T]he ADA seeks to build a society
which encourages and supports the efforts of each individual to live a productive
life."
159. Kim, supra note 129, at 16.
160. Id. (citing Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 136 (1991)).
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never be completely eliminated."l 61 Such an inference allows judges
to circumvent the new construction standard, which is contrary to the
ADA's congressional intent. 16 2
Another possibility is that despite its strong bipartisan support, 163
strong opposition from big business led Congress to take a "just get it
passed" attitude towards enacting the ADA. Both the Senate and
House faced hurdles in passing the ADA:
[B]usiness organizations, who had deep concerns about the cost
burden and the litigation potential of the ADA, lobbied vigorously
by applying constituent pressure on members. The main issue in the
House was the effect of the ADA on businesses and governments
covered by the ADA's provisions; many changes were made to
make the ADA more acceptable to entities covered by the ADA.16
Given the lack of legislative history specifically addressing
successor liability, and the political landscape in which the ADA was
passed, either of the above possibilities is likely. More importantly, it
makes the assertion that silence was an intentional omission unlikely.
B. Legislative Action
A call for legislative resolution is warranted and within reach. In
2008, Congress passed a sweeping amendment to stop what it
considered to be a judicial misinterpretation of "a disabled person"
under the ADA .165 The catalyst for the last major change to the ADA
Making this change
was Supreme Court misinterpretation.
legislatively now prevents avoidable discrimination and avoids the
lengthy delay a Supreme Court decision entails, and the possibility the
Court will decide the issue incorrectly. Congress should amend
section 12183, and in conjunction with that amendment, include a
defense for innocent purchasers.
161. SINGER, supra note 53.
162. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2) (2006).
163. See Young, supra note 1, at xix. The Senate passed the ADA by a vote of
76 to 8 on September 7, 1989 and the House passed the ADA by a vote of 403 to 20,
on May 22, 1990. Id.
164. Id. at xviii-xix.
165. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553
(2008) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 note (2008)).
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1. Amendment to the ADA
Congress should amend section 12183 to expressly state:
New construction discrimination includes the offering and purchase
of a facility that is already in violation of the ADA new
construction standards. A subsequent owner must bring his facility
into compliance with new construction standards, regardless of
participation in the construction or design of the non-compliant
facility.
This would make the section plain on its face. The amendment
could closely mirror the Amendments Act of 2008.166 Additional
language in the amendment should address the conflicting judicial
interpretations of section 12183 and state that such interpretations are
leading to an unjust result, which allow the new construction
standards to be circumvented. The similarities between the purposes
of this amendment and the Amendments Act of 2008 would make
passage more likely. Additionally, including a defense for innocent
purchasers would make the amendment more attractive to both sides.
2. Innocent PurchaserDefense
State legislation can serve as a guide to the federal government to
gauge how well a similar federal law might work.167 State laws that
parallel the ADA can serve as "laboratories" of change for the federal
government.168 In this case, one example is California Senate Bill
1186 ("SBl186").169 Among other things, SB1186 recognizes the
issues successive owners and lessees have with respect to obtaining
non-compliant property.170 SB1186 requires certain disclosures in
demand letters for construction-related lawsuits and by commercial
property owners in lease agreements to indicate whether the property
has met state-level certification for ADA compliance.171 Thus,
166. Id.
167. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).

168. Id.
169. 2012 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 383, 1 (S.B. 1186) (West).
170. Id.
171. Id.
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SB 1186 recognizes the issue of imposing liability on successive
property owners and aims to protect them.
Understandable sympathy exists for a person who finds himself
on the wrong side of a new construction violation by unknowingly
purchasing a noncompliant building. Opponents (including judges) of
imposing successor liability might feel they are protecting these
innocent business owners. It is a difficult situation where the law
dictates which "innocent" party to impose a penalty on. 172 However,
purchasing a building to use as a public accommodation is a
sophisticated transaction, such that the buyer should know to check
for potential liabilities.! 73
In this sense, the purchaser is not
"innocent."
Nevertheless, a defense similar to the ILO defense would work
well to protect truly innocent owners of public accommodations under
the ADA. Congress could establish provisions similar to CERCLA's
ILO and apply them to the ADA regarding who could qualify as
"innocent" as a matter of law. For example, Congress can require a
buyer of a public accommodation to prove they conducted appropriate
inquiries regarding ADA compliance. The key would lie in proving
the timing of the inquiries. The buyer would need to show the
inquiries took place prior to the final purchase to demonstrate that the
required affirmative action to discover any ADA noncompliance was
taken before purchasing the public accommodation. Appropriate
inquiries could include: determining the date of construction to see if
the new construction standards apply, getting a State-certified access
specialist (if the State has one) to inspect and give a report on
compliance, conducting visual inspections using the Technical
Assistance Manual for laypersons, and researching title for previous
liens or lawsuits related to the property. 174 If the inquires yield a
reasonable belief that the appropriate ADA standards were met but a
subsequent lawsuit for noncompliance still arises, the ADA-ILO
defense could act to protect the current owner.
172. See John H. Scheid, Down Labyrinthine Ways: A Recording Acts Guide
for First Year Law Students, 80 U. DET. MERCY L. REV., 91, 102-103 (2002).
(Inconsistent conveyances of land are an example of another seemingly "unfair"
situation. There the law dictates which of two innocent purchasers lose the land
they believed to be rightfully theirs).
173. See id. at 102.
174. Adaptedfrom 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B)(iii)(I-X) (2006).
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Incorporating this defense into an amendment to impose successor
liability would "soften the blow" and could make the amendment's
passage more likely. Such a defense would make explicit the
currently implied responsibility to check for ADA violations before
purchasing a public accommodation. Thus, with an express defense
available, if a subsequent owner of a public accommodation finds
themselves on the defense side of an ADA new construction violation,
it would be their own fault because ignorantialegis neminem excusat
(ignorance is no defense to the law).
C. ProperJudicialInterpretation
Courts must properly interpret the "new construction" sections of
the ADA in a way that will carry out the ADA's purposes under a
remedial scheme, rather than diminish the capacity to enforce them.
1. The Supreme Court Should Callfor Deferment to the Departmentof
Justice in ADA Cases
In Lema, the court acknowledged the U.S. Supreme Court has not
decided whether courts must defer to the DOJ in ADA cases."' Lema
seemed tentative in its interpretation of sections 12182 and 12183, as
evidenced by the statement, "The court notes further that, to the extent
its interpretation of the statute is incorrect. . . ."176 Of course, if the
Supreme Court held that courts must defer to the DOJ, it would be
declaring that the statute is ambiguous and thus deferment to the ADA
would be proper under Chevron. Essentially, the Supreme Court
would be issuing a standardized canon.
2. Clarificationfrom the Departmentof Justice
It follows that the DOJ should issue an official regulation to
strengthen the proper interpretation of section 12183. While the new
definition of "existing facility" seems rather clear,' 7 7 stating directly
that section 12183 applies to current owners regardless of their
175.
(C.D. Cal.
176.
177.

Lema v. Carson Hotel, LLC, No. CV-10-07816-MMM (Ex), at *18 n.37
June 19, 2012) (order granting partial summary judgment).
Id .at *20.
28 C.F.R. pt. 36 app. A (2011).
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participation in their building's construction or design would leave no
room for doubt. Urging the DOJ to put out an official regulation will
have a large impact on the issue only if higher courts push/require
lower courts to defer to the DOJ. While more courts would defer if
the DOJ released something directly on point, 7 8 without a
standardized canon, many would still find the statute clear on its face
and avoid the DOJ altogether.
Lema is currently being appealed to the Ninth Circuit. 7 9 If the
Supreme Court had already weighed in on deferment to the DOJ, and
in turn the DOJ had clarified its stance on successor liability for new
construction, the Ninth Circuit would be sure to reverse Lema and
establish precedent to impose new construction liability on current
owners. Because these things have not happened, the risk is high that
this court might continue to reinforce discrimination through improper
judicial interpretation.
D. Front-EndEnforcement
Litigation reigns supreme as the main way to enforce ADA
compliance.o8 0 Litigation means that a problem has already occurred.
This approach assures continued violations, because enforcement is
occurring on the back-end rather than the front. Lawsuits arise when a
disabled person runs into a problem with inaccessible buildings long
after a facility has been built.' 8 1 While facilities built before January
26, 1993 will continue to be litigated as "readily achievable"
violations are encountered, litigation regarding new construction
should be limited.18 2 More measures need to be employed to prevent

178. Lema v. Carson Hotel, LLC, No. CV-10-07816-MMM (Ex), at *18 n.37
(C.D. Cal. June 19, 2012) (order granting partial summary judgment).
179. Order for Extension of Time to File Opening Brief, Lema v. Carson
Hotel, LLC, No. 12-56371 (9th Cir. April 15, 2013), ECF No. 11. Plaintiff has been
granted an extension of time to file the appellate brief, due June 24, 2013.
Defendant's answering brief is due July 24, 2013. Id.
180. U.S. Dep't. of Justice, ADA Title III Technical Assistance Manual § III7.1000 (1994 Supp.), available at http://www.ada.gov/taman3.html (last visited Oct.
27, 2012).
181. Id.
182. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv); 12183(a)(1) (2006).
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violations on the front end so that builders and buyers perpetuate less
new construction violations, discrimination, and litigation.
Some states have programs to help meet ADA requirements on
the design and construction end. One example is California's
Certified Access Specialist program (CASp).18 3 Created via Senate
Bill 262 in 2003, it aims to provide the public with "experienced,
trained, and tested individuals who can render opinions as to the
compliance of buildings and sites . . . with the Americans with
Disabilities Act .. ."184 Both certification to become a specialist and

obtaining the certification to show a facility complies with the ADA
are voluntary.18 5
Mandatory state certification for the construction of public
accommodations would require a specialist to ensure new construction
standards are met before a facility is deemed ready for use.
Regardless of whether the builder immediately sells or not, the
building would be ADA compliant. A side benefit to mandatory
building certification would be an increase in employment, because
state access specialists can charge for their services.18 6 In turn, the
state receives more money for the program through more application
fees. For example, becoming a certified access specialist in California
costs $1600.187 While separate from the successor liability issue,
these benefits are noteworthy. Front-end enforcement prevents
discrimination from occurring in the future, saving courts and owners
of public accommodations money and headaches.
The Federal Assistant Attorney General is empowered to certify
that state or local laws meet or exceed the minimum standards of the
ADA." 18 1 State and local applications continue to fail to meet the
higher federal standards of the ADA, and thus the DOJ does not

183. Voluntary Certified Access Specialist (CASp) program, DIVISION OF THE
STATE ARCHITECT, www.dgs.ca.gov/dsa/Programs/programCert/casp.aspx. (last
visited Oct. 20th, 2012). (A recent change reduces the fee for architects, landscape
architects, civil engineers and structural engineers to $1,200).
184. Id.
185. Id.

186. Id.
187. Id.

188. 28 C.F.R. § 36.602 (2011).
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certify them.18 9 States should legislate more effectively to earn the
DOJ's certification. This would help prevent ADA litigation at the
state level because certification acts as rebuttable evidence that the
state law or ordinance meets or exceeds the minimum requirements of
the ADA."' 90
One attorney who specializes in representing hotels noted, "[T]he
cost of preventing a potential [ADA] disaster is so small, the process
so easy, the exposure so great, and the benefits so significant, that
[one] simply cannot afford to overlook [ADA compliance]." 1 91
V. CONCLUSION

Persons with disabilities have historically been treated
unequally by society.19 2 Imagine the difficulty of losing the ability to
walk.193 When relegated to a wheelchair, a person, with the same
strong mental abilities intact as before their disability would hope to
re-enter society with dignity and self-respect. An encounter with a
noncompliant building can rob one of these feelings, and instead
create feelings of helplessness and reliance on others.
The ADA requires new buildings and alterations to meet certain
requirements.
Since January 26, 1993, new construction and
alterations on public accommodations have been required to adhere to
specific guidelines.194 If not met, discrimination has occurred under
the ADA.1 95 In order to function as a dignified and independent
person, a disabled person has the right to sue to bring these facilities

189. For an example of an application that was denied see Letter from
Lawrence W. Roffee, Exec. Dir., U.S. Architectural & Transportation Barriers
Compliance Board, to Michael J. Mankin, Chief, State of California, Department of
General Services, Division of the State Architect (Sept. 30, 2004) available at
http://www.documents.dgs.ca.gov/dsalother/usdoj-coverletter-attach-a.pdf.
190. 28 C.F.R. § 36.602 (2011).
191. Jim Butler, California Opens Door to More ADA Litigation, but also
Offers Protection to the Well-Informed, HOTEL NEwS RESOURCE, (Oct. 5, 2009),
http://www.hotelnewsresource.com/article41486.html.
192. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (2006).
193. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2006 & Supp. II 2009) This is one example of
many types of disabilities covered by the ADA.
194. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv) (2006).
195. Id.
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into compliance.1 96 However, if courts interpret section 12183 to
mean that the current owner does not have ADA liability, or that a
plaintiff cannot sue, the disabled patron has no recourse and will find
himself in a helpless situation that Congress never intended. Congress
intended to give power to the disabled to stop discrimination.197
This Comment proposes imposing new construction liability on
current property owners, despite their lack of involvement in the
facility's construction or design. Several approaches would effectuate
this change. Congress could amend section 12183 to expressly address
the current and inconsistent judicial interpretations, which have
allowed new construction requirements to be ignored. A defense for
innocent purchasers coupled with the amendment would balance what
some may interpret as "more liability." Other remedial statutes that
have already imposed successor liability and provided defenses would
serve as good references.
Absent legislative action, courts must start interpreting section
12183 in a way that prevents discrimination, carrying out
congressional intent and closing the loophole in ADA coverage. A
clear opinion from the DOJ that section 12183 acts to impose liability
on successive property owners, together with a ruling from the
Supreme Court for courts to defer to the DOJ in relevant cases would
ensure this occurs.
Lastly, an effort to limit lawsuits through stronger front-end
enforcement would save money and prevent discrimination. One way
to accomplish this is to encourage more states to create access
programs under the DOJ and require new construction of public
accommodations to be certified through those programs. Another way
is for states to create stronger parallel laws to the ADA, which the
DOJ would find worthy of certification. Together, these options
would limit liability.
The ADA's statutory framework is unclear. Justice requires
clarification concerning the rights and remedies available under the
ADA with respect to the question of which standard to apply to new
facilities held by successive owners. Absent legislative action, such
clarity can only come by administrative action or by binding judicial
interpretation. No matter who is first to tackle this issue, a call must
196. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a) (2006).
197. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1-4) (2006).
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be made. The result needs to ensure that disabled persons can
exercise their civil rights under the ADA.
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